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ABSTRACT
This  study  attempts  to  estimate the  ‘utility  cost’  of temporary  employment  contracts  purged  of  the 
psychological effects of adaptation.  A conjoint analysis experiment is used that examines the ex-ante contract 
preferences  of  a  unique  sample  of  low-skilled  employees  from  7  European  countries.    It  is  shown  that 
permanent contract holders request a significant wage premium to move to a temporary job.  In contrast, 
temporary workers are indifferent between permanent and temporary contracts, ceteris paribus.  The evidence 
suggests that individuals have a psychological immune system which neutralises events that challenge their 
sense of well-being, such as job insecurity.  
INTRODUCTION
A thoroughly deprived person, leading a very reduced life, might not appear to be badly off in terms of the 
mental  metric  of  utility,  if  the  hardship  is  accepted  with  non-grumbling  resignation.  In  situations  of 
longstanding deprivation, the victims do not go on weeping all the time, and very often make great efforts to 
take pleasure in small mercies and cut down personal desires to modest – ‘realistic’ – proportions. The 
person’s deprivation then, may not at all show up in the metrics of pleasure, desire fulfilment, etc., even 
though he or she may be quite unable to be adequately nourished, decently clothed, minimally educated and 
so on” (Amartya Sen, 1990, p. 45).
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In recent times there has been an increasing focus of public policy on the use of ‘flexible’ labour markets 
practices as a means of safeguarding employers from global competitive pressures (Harrison, 1998).  As this
initiative has frequently encouraged the widespread use of ‘atypical’ forms of employment (e.g. part-time 
work, temporary contracts, non-standard  working hours), it has come into conflict with previous existing 
social norms of the workplace, such as the reliance on long-term employer-employee relationships.  For this 
reason  it  has  often  been  argued  that  the  shift  to  non-standard  employment  contracts  has  had adverse 
repercussions on job security and individual well-being.  For instance, it has been shown that individuals in 
the labour market now experience more unstable working lives, with those in part-time and temporary jobs 
facing far shorted job durations and greater job instability compared to those in full-time/permanent contracts
(Gregg and Wadsworth, 1995; 1996).  
Economists and policymakers have also become increasingly interested in investigating the impact of 
precarious employment on individuals’ well-being and quality of life.  It is now customary in the literature to 
utilize subjective measures of well-being in order to estimate the utility loss of moving to non-standard forms 
of employment (Booth et al., 2002; Kaiser, 2002; Pouliakas and Theodossiou, 2005[a],[b]; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
and  van-Praag,  2006). Such  studies  have generally  found  ambiguous  effects  of  atypical contracts on
individual job satisfaction, which usually vary depending on the countries that are examined.      
In this paper it is argued that drawing conclusions about the effect of economic and policy changes on the 
basis of ex post subjective evaluations of individual well-being is likely to be misleading.  It has for a long 
time been acknowledged that satisfaction questions suffer from a number of weaknesses, most notably that
they are affected by a process of adaptation and coping
i (Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Easterlin, 1974,
2001; Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999) and are contaminated by cognitive dissonance
ii (Festinger, 1957) or 
rationalization (Gilbert, 2006). In light of the above psychological processes, the evaluation of the effect of 
any job characteristic on individual satisfaction is a particularly troublesome issue.  Due to adaptation, coping 
and cognitive dissonance, the long-term impact on well-being of a change in the situation of an individual is 
expected  to  be  smaller  than  one  would  have  anticipated  a  priori  or  at  the  instant  moment  of  change 
(Brickmen and Campbell, 1971; Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999; Helson, 1947; Kahneman et al., 1999).  
Casual empiricism would nevertheless suggest that there is still a significant welfare cost that human beings 
experience in the period of transition from a favourable to an unfavourable state (e.g. from employment to 
unemployment).  Thus, even though individuals might eventually adapt to unfortunate circumstances of life, 
mitigating the unhappiness and disruption that they experience for months, even years, in the interim certainly 3
seems like a worthwhile objective for policy.  However, in order to investigate the transitional impact of any 
economic  or  policy  change  (such  as  a  shift  towards  insecure  contracts)  on  individual  well-being,  it  is 
necessary to purge the effects of adaptation and cognitive dissonance.  
This is the focus of the present study, which attempts to control for the inevitability of adaptation by 
resorting to a stated preferences technique known as conjoint analysis (Green et al., 2001; Hair et al., 1998).  
The novelty of this technique is that it ultimately allows the researcher to uncover the ex ante preferences of 
workers over a number of hypothetical jobs that have not yet been realized, that is prior to any psychological 
adaptation phenomena coming into play.  Using a newly developed sample of homogenous workers from 
seven European countries, it is thus shown that once adaptation is controlled for a significantly large wage 
premium is required to induce workers on permanent contracts to move to temporary employment.  This 
finding  becomes  more  striking  when  it  is  contrasted  to  the  preferences  of  observationally  equivalent 
temporary  employees,  as  the  latter  are  found  to  be  indifferent  between  the  permanent  and  temporary 
contractual options.  
Given  that  current  temporary  contract  holders  have  presumably  adjusted their  perceptions  to  the 
circumstances  surrounding  an insecure  contract,  the paper  further examines  whether  their  indifference is 
likely to be the outcome of the workings of adaptation, rather than of other plausible economic reasons (e.g. 
career  prospects,  imperfect information,  differential unobserved  risk preferences).  Overall, the empirical 
evidence  is  supportive  of  arguments  that  individuals  have  a psychological  immune  system  (Wilson  and 
Gilbert, 2003; Gilbert, 2006, p. 162) which detects and neutralises events that challenge our sense of well-
being (such as job insecurity).  Nonetheless, the fact that the empirical results confirm the well-documented 
disutility associated  with  joblessness  (Clark  and  Oswald,  1994;  Winkelmann  &  Winkelmann,  1998; 
Theodossiou, 1998) suggests that adaptation may be of a different intensity for different states (Clark et al., 
2004; Dolan and Kahneman, 2008, p. 216).  Finally, and in accordance with the practice of a number of 
psychological experiments (Gilbert, 2006, p. 223-228), this paper attempts to obtain a monetary estimate of 
the extent of the utility loss associated with a move to non-permanent employment, by comparing the wage 
premiums of permanent employees with those of their temporary surrogates.  
The  present  paper  is  structured  as  follows.    Section  I briefly  reviews  some  of  the  existing  studies 
examining the impact of temporary contracts on employee well-being.  In Section II the conjoint analysis 
methodology  is  outlined,  while  Section  III  describes  the  data  collection  procedure.    In  Section  IV the 
econometric technique is explained.  Sections V and VI contain an extensive discussion of the empirical 4
results, while Section VII engages in sensitivity analysis that scrutinizes the various economic interpretations 
of the findings. Finally, Section VIII advocates the adaptation hypothesis of this paper, while Section IX 
concludes with some criticisms and suggestions for future research.
I. LITERATURE REVIEW
Economists have recently estimated the utility cost of precarious forms of work by examining the difference 
in the stated job satisfaction of individuals who are employed in non-permanent jobs with those who occupy
permanent positions.  Booth et al. (2002) have shown that temporary jobs in the UK are not desirable as a 
means of long-term careers.  They typically pay less than corresponding permanent jobs, and are associated 
with  lower  levels  of  job  satisfaction  and  poorer  work-related  training.
iii    The  strong  dissatisfaction  of 
temporary and part-time workers is also highlighted by Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2005[a]) in the case of 
Greece.  On a different note, Green and Tsitsianis (2005) have argued that rising job insecurity in Britain and 
Germany, following the trend towards atypical contracts, cannot explain the fall in job satisfaction in either 
country,  while  factors  such  as  the  intensification  of  work  effort  and  declining  task  discretion  are  more 
appropriate culprits.  Finally, Pouliakas and Theodossiou (2005[b]) and Ferrer-i-Carbonell and van-Praag 
(2006) have embarked on cross-country comparisons to show that the ultimate effect of the type of contract 
on  job  satisfaction seems  to  depend  on  institutional  features  of  the  countries  under  investigation,  which 
determine the extent to which individuals who work on non-permanent contracts do so by choice rather than 
compulsion.  
Drawing conclusions about the effect of economic and policy changes on the basis of differences in the 
ex post subjective evaluation of individual well-being is, nevertheless, likely to be misleading, due to the 
phenomenon of hedonic adaptation (Frederick and Loewenstein, 1999).  One of the most remarkable traits of 
human beings is their ability to adapt to changing situations, such as an income increase or devastating health 
events (Brickman et al., 1978), by changing their aspirations with the passage of time.  The Easterlin paradox 
(2001), whereby no time-series relationship is found between income and happiness in advanced Western 
economies, has typically been attributed to the offsetting workings of adaptation (Frey and Stutzer, 2002).  
Gilbert (2006, p. 152-152) and Dolan and Kahneman (2008) also discuss the implications of adaptation in the 
context of the evaluation of different states of health by able-bodied people, who tend to underestimate how 
surprisingly resilient people are in the face of trauma. It follows that if human beings rationalize their state of 5
affairs in such a manner, job satisfaction scores are not likely to be constant neither immutable.  Instead, due 
to the impact of the psychological processes of adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance, the long-run 
impact of changing conditions on individual well-being should be smaller than one would have anticipated a 
priori.
Of course, one way of avoiding this complication is to uncover the level of satisfaction that the individual 
experiences at the instant moment of change in his/her circumstances.  It is in this spirit that Leontaridi and 
Theodossiou (2004) used the BHPS to evaluate the effect of employment status on individual well-being in 
the period straight after a labour market transition has occurred.  The authors argued that in the first period of 
transition it may be expected that the process of adaptation has not yet worked itself out to its full extent.  
With this assumption, they showed that transitions from full-time employment to joblessness or part-time 
work are associated with a significant reduction in individual utility.       
The  present  study  takes  an  alternative  approach  to  overcoming  the  aforementioned  psychological 
difficulties.  It attempts to control for the inevitability of ex post adaptation and coping by resorting to a stated 
or revealed preference technique known as conjoint analysis (EPICURUS project, 2005; Pouliakas, 2007).  
The novelty of this methodology is that it ultimately allows the researcher to uncover the ex ante preferences 
of a sample of workers over a given number of attributes that are typical of most jobs.  Given the evidence of
numerous psychological studies suggesting that ‘the intuitive forecasts of lay people generally fail to [take 
due account of adaptation]’ (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008, p. 217), this technique enables the detection of the
“uncontaminated” by adaptation effect of a change in labour market events on individual well-being.  In the 
next section a description of this methodology is provided.  
II. THE CONJOINT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Inspired by previous research that has sought to reveal individual preferences for health care or a nature area
(Adamowicz et al. 1994; Ryan and Farrar, 2000), this study is one of the first to use the stated preferences 
methodology of conjoint analysis in order to identify how individuals value the various attributes of a job.
iv  
Conjoint  analysis  is  a  data  collection  method  that  is  rooted  in  random  utility  theory  (McFadden,  1973; 
Hanemann, 1984; van Beek et al., 1997) and which allows researchers to disentangle the preferences of 
individuals based on information that they state in a questionnaire.  In the context of this paper, respondents 
are  presented  with  and  are  then  asked  to  make  choices  between  alternative  hypothetical  job  scenarios 6
involving different levels of attributes that have been identified as important for influencing the quality of 
work.  Assume that a job may be adequately described by a attributes.  Hence, one may describe a job by a 
vector ...) , , ( 13 12 11 1 q q q q a  , the so called ‘job vignette’.  Individuals are then offered a finite number of 
vignettes (e.g. q1a, q2a, q3a ...) and are asked to evaluate them.  In this manner, the respondents are forced to 
trade-off some characteristics for others and to incorporate opportunity cost in their decision-making process, 
akin to the way that they make decisions in the real world.  The vignettes are eventually analysed in terms of 
how sensitive the answers are with respect to changes in the vignette descriptions.  
Given the traditional reliance of economists on market, or revealed, preference (RP) data, there may be 
doubts as to what is the predictive value of stated preference (SP) estimation based on reactions to vignettes.  
Yet, a significant number of studies over the last thirty years have now indicated that “practically speaking,
SP  and  RP  seem  to  match  up  surprising  well  in  different  choice  contexts,  cultures  and  time  periods” 
(Louviere  et  al.,  2000,  p.  12),  and  that  one  can  make  valid  and  reliable  predictions  about  real  market 
behaviour using SP data (Louviere et al., 2000, p. 21).  Importantly, the ability of the vignette approach to 
substantially widen the range of hypothetical contract alternatives faced by respondents is particularly fitting 
for the specific purposes of this study.  The reason is that it allows the inference of the impact of a temporary 
contract on employees’ perceptions prior to them actually taking up the said contract, which, of course, is 
unfeasible with observational data alone.  It hence becomes possible in this manner to control for the impact 
of the psychological processes of adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance on individual preferences.        
III. CONSTRUCTION OF THE VIGNETTE DATASET
The data for this study are derived from a survey of workers in lower- and middle-skilled occupations that 
was  undertaken  as  part  of  the  EU-funded  EPICURUS  project  in  August  and  September  2004  in  seven 
European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK).  For the purpose 
of  comparability,  individuals  from  all  countries  responded  to  an  (appropriately  translated)  identical 
questionnaire.  A specialized survey company was used to ensure that appropriate dissemination and data 
collection procedures were followed.  Moreover, due to time and budget considerations it was decided that a 
homogenous group of individuals should be chosen.  The final sample therefore includes salaried workers 
whose employment is the main activity (excluding students), employed in all industries except agriculture and 7
fishery, between the age of 18 to 65, with a maximum educational level of 4 in the ISCED International 
Classification of 1997.  
The data was administered online via the Internet, except for Greece where face-to-face interviews were 
organized instead, since the degree of Internet penetration at the time of the survey was relatively low in that 
country.  The eventual size of the sample varied in each country as follows: 1,011 observations in Denmark, 
1,008 in France, 1,007 in the Netherlands, 1,002 in the United Kingdom, 800 in Greece, 331 in Finland and 
304 in Spain.    
In addition to the usual question modules regarding personal and job characteristics, a considerable part 
of the questionnaire was used for offering vignettes to the respondents.  A typical vignette is shown in Figure
1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Every individual was offered a set of five vignettes at random, each one of them consisting of the following
set of ten attributes relating to a hypothetical job: Type of contract, net wages (described as a percentage of 
current  wages)
v,  working  hours,  working  times,  access  to  training  opportunities,  whether  team  work  is 
involved, possibilities of control over own work, working tempo in terms of high speed and tight deadlines, 
age of retirement and labour disability, and the loyalty between employer/employee (Akerlof, 1982).  Details 
of the attributes and of the specific levels they take are presented in Table 1.  Respondents were finally asked 
to ‘evaluate’ the five vignettes by grading them on a numerical scale from 0 to 10.  A full description of the 
procedural issues surrounding the design of the conjoint questionnaire can be found in Appendix 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
IV. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY
Following the pioneering work of Lancaster (1966, 1971) and Rosen (1974), it is assumed that the utility that 
a worker derives from his/her job stems from the characteristics (attributes) that describe the job, rather than 
from the job per se.  In the context of this paper, a ‘job’, j, is defined as a function of ten attributes, a = 
1,…,10, as specified in the vignette experiment, plus the other characteristics describing the respondents’
present jobs, Xwn.  Each individual, n, is offered a set of five vignettes  a a ja q q q 5 1 ,...,  , where each vignette is 
described by the vector  ) ; ,... ( 10 1 wn j j ja X q q q  .  It is thus assumed that an individual’s latent evaluation, 8
*
jn U , of a vignette depends on the attribute values of the vignette, on his/her personal traits, Xn, and on the 
current work characteristics, Xwn.  Hence:
(1) ) , , (
*
wn n ja n jn X X q U U 
If it is further postulated that the evaluation of a job (vignette) is a linear function of the attributes, the 
individual and job characteristics of the respondent and a random error term, εn, then the following latent 
regression model is implied: 
(2) jn wn n jan jn X X q U           
*
where the vectors , γ, δ capture the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the individual’s stated 
preference. 
The  variable 
*
jn U  is a latent variable  as the answers  to  the  vignette questions are  measured  on a 
discrete scale 0, 1…, 10.  Traditionally in the literature such discrete choice models are analyzed by means of 
Ordered  Probit/Logit  techniques.    However,  a  feature  of  conjoint  analysis  is  that  multiple  evaluation 
responses are collected per individual, which violates the assumption of independent errors.  Hence, panel
econometric techniques are used in order to take the potential unobserved heterogeneity into account.  In 
addition, given that the study also seeks to correct for selectivity bias it has been necessary to facilitate the 
estimation of the model by adopting an appropriate linearization of the ordinal variable Ujn.  The linearization 
used in the context of this study is the Cardinal OLS (COLS) approach (van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2004), which replaces the inexactly known value Ujn by its conditional expectation  jn U  (Maddala, 1983, p.
366).
vi  In this manner, OLS can be applied to the linear model:
(3) jn wn n jan jn X X q U           9
where  jn   is a symmetric error term with mean zero.      
Furthermore, in order to take the probable correlation structure between the multiple individual vignette 
evaluations into  account,  a  random  effects  model is  employed  (Wooldridge,  2002).
vii    Thus,  the  basic 
econometric procedure that is utilized in this paper is to estimate the following valuation equation:
(4) jn n wn n jan jn X X q U             
where εn is the individual term that is invariant to the alternative vignettes, and ηjnis a pure random error term 
with E(ηjn) = 0 and E(εn|ηjn) = 0.  
Finally, in order to correct for the fact that a non-random allocation of individual workers into different 
types of contractual arrangements  may lead  to  inconsistent estimates  (Heckman, 1979),  a Heckman-type 
model has also been estimated (see Appendix 2 for details). For this reason, regression estimates based on a
standard “switching regression model with endogenous switching” (Lee, 1978) are also reported in the main 
tables below.  
V. THE ESTIMATION SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
For the estimation of equation (4) a pooled sample of workers from seven European countries (Denmark, 
Finland,  Netherlands,  France,  Greece,  Spain,  UK)  is  used.
viii    Among  a  total  of  5463  individuals,  4507 
(82.52%)  reported  that  their  job  involved  a  permanent  contract  (with  no  fixed  ending  time),  while  494 
(9.05%) were on fixed-term employment.
ix  Given that with the vignette experiment five responses were 
amassed  on  average  per  individual,  the  total  sample  includes  26755  observations,  with  22075  of  those 
referring to individuals on permanent employment, and 2430 to fixed-term employees.  
Tables 2 and 3 show some representative descriptive statistics for these two groups of workers.  From 
Table 2, in particular, it can be seen that a larger proportion of temporary workers comprises of young, single 
females who were unemployed in the previous year and who currently moonlight or work in unskilled jobs 
involving a fixed routine and/or lack of training opportunities.  Importantly, it can also be seen that fixed-term 
workers have a lower average (ex post) job satisfaction score compared to their permanent counterparts, 
though a Student’s t-test reveals that this difference is not statistically significant (t = 0.19).  One could 10
therefore  conclude  on  the  basis  of  satisfaction  ratings  that  there  is  no  (or  a  small)  utility  cost  between
permanent and temporary employment.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Nevertheless, Table 3 indicates a significant fall in the average job evaluation of permanent workers when
exposed to vignettes involving a temporary contract option (relative to the option of a no-risk permanent 
contract).  In contrast, workers who are presently in temporary posts are generally found to be less critical of
their vignette sequences (including those with the temporary contract options).  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
Finally, it is noted that in general there is a reasonable degree of cross-country consistency in the vignette 
evaluations.
x    
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical results for the separate samples of permanent and temporary workers are displayed in Table 4.  
They are  generated from the  estimation of the job evaluation equation (4)  for each sub-sample, initially
correcting for individual and current job characteristics and, subsequently, also correcting for the possibility 
of endogenous choice among alternative contract types. Based on these estimates, Table 5 reports the trade-
offs between the various attributes and changes in percentage of the wage (w). These indicate the extent of 
monetary compensation that an average individual requires when a particular job dimension deteriorates, in 
order to keep him/her on the same indifference curve as before. Known as the marginal willingness to pay, 
they are given by the following ratio:
(5)
w
a
jw
ja
q
q


 


In the context of this paper the focus is on the amount of compensation that an individual would require 
to switch from a riskless permanent contract to a temporary contract with varying future prospects.11
Ex ante preferences of permanent workers
Table 4 indicates that, after controlling for a set of vignette, personal and current job characteristics, 
European  employees  enjoying  the  stability  of  a  permanent  contract  consider that  a  move  to  temporary 
employment  is  associated  with  significant  disutility.    In  particular,  it  is  found  that  in  order  to  induce 
permanent workers to accept a temporary contract with prospects of continuation to another permanent or 
temporary  contract,  they  would  require  a  15.5%  and  a  14%  wage  premium  over  their  current  wages, 
respectively.    The  well-documented  distress  associated  with  joblessness  (Clark  and  Oswald,  1994; 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998; Theodossiou, 1998) is also confirmed, as it is found that permanent 
employees would require a 37% wage premium in order to take up a temporary job that would eventually lead 
to unemployment.
Furthermore,  the  results  show  that  permanent contract  holders  believe  that  the  second  most  inferior
contract following a temporary contract leading to unemployment is a risky permanent contract that offers no 
severance pay.  This indicates a strong preference for unemployment insurance by the workers in the sample.  
As the hypothesis of the equality of the coefficients between the latter two contract types is rejected (χ
2 (2) = 
368.07),  this  also  confirms  the  significant  disutility  that  permanent  workers  expect  to  receive  from 
unemployment.  In addition, the similar magnitude between the coefficients of the ‘temporary to temporary’ 
and ‘temporary to permanent’ contract options imply that permanent workers ‘dislike’ temporary contracts in 
general regardless of their future prospects.    
What is important for the purposes of this study is that these figures should be ‘uncontaminated’ from 
any adaptation effects and, thus, reflect the immediate impact of a potential change in employment status on 
individual well-being.  As suggested by numerous psychological studies, “people underestimate the extent to 
which they and others will adapt to changed circumstances” (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008, p. 217), although
they  “can  generally  predict  the  valence  and  type  of  emotion  from  events  reasonably  well”  (Dolan  and 
Kahneman, 2008, p. 222).  The reason for this apparent failure to take account of adaptation is because of the 
way in which current emotions intrude on assessments of the future (Gilbert, 2006, p. 109).  This directs 
people to focus on the immediate affective reactions to changed states (‘presentism’), thereby consistently
underestimating how differently they will feel ex post.  So from the estimated wage premiums of Table 5 one 
can draw the conclusion that the anticipated “utility loss” of moving from a riskless permanent contract to the 
insecurity of a temporary job or no work at all is quite notable.       
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]12
Ex ante preferences of temporary workers
Although the elicitation of utilities from current permanent employees should be purged of any psychological 
adaptation  effects,  this  should  not  be  the  case  for  those  individuals  who  already  hold  non-permanent 
positions.  For this latter group of workers it is expected that their evaluation of different hypothetical jobs is 
already affected by their current experience with precarious employment.  The effects of adaptation and the 
attempt to rationalize the dissonance associated with insecure contractual agreements should therefore be 
ingrained  in  their  answers.    It  is  thus  expected  that  the  trade-offs  of  individuals  who  are  currently  in 
temporary employment should be smaller than those of their permanent counterparts, as the former have 
already adjusted their perceptions to the conditions surrounding a temporary contract.    
Indeed, Tables 4 and 5 confirm this a priori expectation as the regression coefficients and monetary 
trade-offs of temporary workers are smaller than the ones that were derived for the observationally equivalent 
permanent contract holders.  Specifically, based on the temporary workers’ responses, a 5% wage premium is 
required to equalize the value of permanent employment with a temporary job leading to a permanent one, 
while 2-3% compensation over current wages is sought after by those on temporary contracts who are likely 
to  continue  on  a  similar  arrangement.    This  is  notably smaller  than  the  14-15.5%  trade-offs  that  were 
previously obtained in the case of permanent contract workers.  Importantly, it is also found that for those 
who  are  currently  in  temporary  work  the  option  of  being  in  temporary  employment  with  prospects  of 
continuation does not yield (statistically) significant disutility in comparison to a riskless permanent contract.  
This is in stark contrast to the significant preference for secure employment arrangements by permanent 
workers.  
Despite the above differences in utilities, it is nevertheless notable that both groups express a significant 
distaste for “dead-end contracts” (i.e. temporary jobs with no prospects of continuation).  As in the case of 
permanent contract workers, Table 5 illustrates that temporary workers would still demand a significant 25% 
wage  premium  over  their  current  wages  in  order  to  be  indifferent  between  a  dead-end  contract  and  a 
permanent contract with no risk of layoff.  This finding implies that the utility cost of unemployment can be
substantial for all types of workers.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]13
VII. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The empirical evidence reported above suggests that a large wage premium is required to induce workers on 
permanent  contracts  to  move  to  temporary  ones,  in  accordance  with  the  theory  of  compensating  wage 
differences (Smith, 1776).  However, a less clear-cut finding is that current temporary workers would not be 
prepared to accept a significant wage reduction to move to a riskless permanent contract.  This appears to be 
incompatible with intertemporal utility maximisation (especially in a world of imperfect capital markets).  
Although  a number  of plausible economic theories  could  underpin such  an outcome  (discussed  in detail 
below), it is argued on the basis of further empirical evidence that an appropriate culprit is the adaptation 
effect, which can play a significant role in moulding the perceptions of individuals who are already subjected 
to non-permanent employment.
From  an  economic  perspective  the  discrepancy  in  the  utilities  of  current  permanent  and  temporary 
workers  can  be  most  obviously  attributed  to  a  selection  effect,  particularly  to  differential  unobserved 
preferences for employment security.  It is clear that given the option value of remaining in a permanent post, 
a permanent job will be more attractive to individuals who have an inherent taste for security.  In contrast, the 
relative flexibility of non-permanent contracts may be appreciated more by individuals who value job security 
less.  Another possible unmeasured factor that could lie behind the disparity in preferences is the “readiness 
for  job  change”.    Specifically,  temporary  workers  who  have  become  accustomed  to  shifting  workplace 
environments  may  have  developed  “migration  skills”  (e.g.  familiarity  and  sufficient  acquisition  of 
information about current job market conditions) that make the job search process less ‘costly’ compared to 
those who have been in a permanent post for a considerable length of time.  Self-selection into different types 
of contractual agreements can therefore potentially explain the smaller wage premiums required by temporary 
employees to move to non-permanent contracts.
Furthermore,  as  the  most  usual  career  development  path  involves  a  move  from  a  temporary  to  a 
permanent job, and bearing in mind the smaller average age of temporary employees (see Table 2), another 
reason for the fact that temporary workers are more sympathetic to non-permanent contracts can simply be 
because they view them as stepping stones to superior future employment.  In addition, due to the lesser 
amount  of  accumulated  work  experience,  the  younger  temporary contract  workers  may  also  suffer  from 
inadequate knowledge of the real value of alternative contract types.  The above line of arguments suggests14
that the differences in the preferences of temporary and permanent workers may be driven mainly by career 
prospects and asymmetric information.
In order to test the viability of the aforementioned explanations, a number of alternative avenues have 
been pursued.  First, to exclude the possibility that endogenous contract choice is the operative effect, a 
Heckman-type model has been employed that simultaneously corrects for the probability of individuals being 
in either contract type (described in more detail in Appendix 2).  As shown in Table 4, the results are found to 
be robust to this alternative estimation methodology.  Combined with the relative homogeneity of the dataset 
used in this paper, it would thus appear that self-selection is not an important driver of the empirical results.
Second,  a  number  of  interactive  dummy  variables  have  been independently  introduced  in  the  main
regression  equation  (4),  to  test  for  the  robustness  of  the  reported  marginal  effects  to  heterogeneity  in 
individual and job characteristics.  Specifically, in order to investigate whether the indifference of temporary 
contract holders for no-risk permanent contracts is related to career prospects or inadequate information, the 
interactive variables of age, gender, and the respondents’ subjective beliefs of their probability of promotion
have been chosen.  The rationale for the selection of these terms is that older workers are more likely to be in 
non-permanent contracts involuntarily and are expected to have adequate knowledge of the real value of 
alternative contract types.  Moreover, flexible contracts have typically acted as the main avenue for the (re-)
integration  of  younger  female  employees  into  the  job  market.    It  follows  that  if  the stated  indifference 
between temporary and risk-free permanent contracts also applies to older, male temporary employees who 
believe  they  have  no  probability  of  promotion,  then  this  should  constitute  evidence  against  the  career-
concerns or asymmetric information explanations.
In order to further examine whether the preference of temporary workers for non-permanent contracts is 
related to indifference for employment security, two additional interaction terms have been added to the main
model.  These capture whether the respondents consider the risk of job loss as a significant incentive for the 
effort that they exert in their work and whether they face considerable financial constraints (which should be 
positively correlated with a preference for job security).
xi  The underlying hypothesis is that if it is found that 
temporary workers who are motivated by employment stability or are facing financial difficulties continue to 
be  significantly  indifferent  to  the  option  of  taking  up  a  secure  contract,  then  this  should  refute  the 
interpretation emphasizing differential risk attitudes among permanent and temporary workers.
The econometric estimates of the above two sets of regressions are reported in Table 6, from which a 
number of interesting insights emerge.  Importantly, in all specifications the finding that current temporary 15
contract holders are indifferent between temporary and risk-free permanent contracts persists, and this is in 
stark contrast to the robust preference of permanent workers for secure employment.  Indeed, the statistically 
insignificant  coefficients  of  the  age,  gender  and  promotion  interaction  terms  suggest  that  the  reported 
indifference  of  temporary  employees  cannot  be  attributed  to  career  progression  neither  to  insufficient 
knowledge of the labour market.  The results in Table 6 also imply that temporary employees are not averse
to insecure contractual options even if they consider the risk of job loss as a significant incentive or are facing 
growing debt.    No  support is therefore  found in  our  dataset  to  support  the  plausibility of  the  economic 
explanations discussed above.  
Other  significant  interactive  terms,  however,  do  suggest  that  heterogeneity  in individual  or  job 
characteristics may affect the respondents’ attitudes to alternative contractual arrangements.  As shown in 
Table 6, there is a significant difference in the preferences of male and female permanent employees, with 
females disliking temporary contracts less.  Furthermore, it is found that permanent contract holders who are 
members of a trade union are more critical of the temporary-to-temporary contract option when compared to 
non-union members.  Other significant differences include the fact that temporary civil servants derive much 
greater disutility from temporary contracts leading to other contracts of temporary duration, relative to those 
who work in the private sector.        
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
VIII. THE ADAPTATION HYPOTHESIS
Given the aforementioned evidence, another possible interpretation for the indifference of temporary workers 
between  the no-risk  permanent  and temporary contract  options includes the adaptation effect.  Although 
typically  overlooked  in  the  traditional  economic literature,  many psychological  studies  now  suggest  that 
individuals are quite adept not only at adapting to changing circumstances, but also to rationalizing events 
once  these  become  inescapable.    As  argued  by  Wilson  and  Gilbert  (2003)  and  Gilbert  (2006,  p.  162), 
individuals  appear  to  have  a  psychological  immune  system  which  defends  the  mind  against  events  that 
challenge our sense of well-being (such as job insecurity).  In other words, the psychological processes of 
adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance can be quite significant in shaping individual preferences.  A
behavioural mechanism of this sort could therefore lie behind the apparent unwillingness of current temporary 
contract holders to exchange a wage reduction for the security of a permanent post.       16
What the above  implies is that  the comparison of the ‘uncontaminated’ (from adaptation) pecuniary 
trade-offs of permanent employees with those of temporary workers, who have already adjusted to their 
precarious  working  conditions,  can  be  interpreted  as  a  monetary estimate  of  the  extent  of  adaptation to 
insecure employment.  Table 5 reports the financial difference between the trade-offs of the two groups of 
workers, whereby it can be seen that those who are presently employed under a non-permanent contract 
request a 10-12% smaller wage premium to move to a hypothetical temporary job compared to those who are 
in permanent employment.  Thus, there can be a substantial difference between the a priori anticipation of the 
‘utility loss’ associated with a move to a precarious contract and the eventual impact of such a circumstance
on individual welfare.  
The implication of the above is that a permanent contract worker who switches to a temporary contract
should  be  compensated at  the  very least with a 10-12%  premium over  his/her current  wage  in  order to 
alleviate the transitional loss in welfare associated with such a move.  For example, consider a permanent 
contract  worker  on  an  annual  salary  of  £20k  who  is  forced  by  exogenous  events  to  accept  fixed-term 
employment.  The empirical findings of this paper suggest that once the individual has adapted to the new 
precarious circumstances, he/she will be equally happy as before if his/her yearly earnings are approximately 
£20.6k - 21k (3% or 5% times £20k).  Nevertheless, the initial wage premium required to compensate the 
individual for the disutility of insecure employment amounts to £3k (15% times £20k).  The transitional loss 
in welfare (or adaptation cost) that is associated with the move to temporary contracts in this example is 
therefore £2k.   
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The empirical findings presented in this study suggest that the anticipated ‘utility loss’ of moving from a 
riskless permanent contract to the insecurity of a temporary job or no work at all can be quite significant once 
the psychological effects of adaptation have been purged.  This finding is particularly important given that the 
relatively low-skilled individuals who comprise the dataset are those who have typically borne the brunt of 
the trend towards flexible employment practices (European Commission, 2004).  The evidence also indicates
that the workings of adaptation, coping and cognitive dissonance can be influential in making individuals 
more content with an unfortunate state of affairs, such as job insecurity.  Finally, the study has suggested a 
novel estimate of the loss in  welfare that is associated with the transition to non-permanent employment 17
status.  This estimate is significant given the wide recognition that it is changes in the states, rather than states 
themselves, that are the carriers of utility (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).  
A growing literature on happiness economics has recently argued compellingly in favour of using ex post
subjective measures of well-being for policy purposes (Layard, 2005).  This study proposes an alternative yet 
complementary measure of utility measurement, one that is based on the method of conjoint analysis.  Such a 
measure  can  overcome  one  of  the  major  deficiencies  of  the  job  satisfaction  question,  namely  that  it  is 
contaminated by adaptation.  Controlling for the effect of adaptation on people’s preferences has important 
implications  for employment policy.  Once  adaptation  manifests itself the long-run  impact of precarious 
employment on well-being is expected to be smaller than one would have anticipated a priori, and this might 
potentially be the effect that is captured by job satisfaction studies.  From a public policy standpoint, evidence 
failing to establish a clear negative impact of non-permanent jobs on welfare can then be used as justification 
for  allocating  resources  and  formulating  employment  legislation  in  favour  of  the  further  proliferation  of 
flexible  employment  contracts.    Yet,  there  may  still  be  a  significant  welfare  cost  that  human  beings 
experience  in  the  transitional  period  from  a  favourable  to  an  unfavourable  state (e.g.  from  employment 
security to insecurity).  Amartya Sen (1990) has persistently made the case that just because the poor adapt to 
poverty  does  not  mean  that  we  should  ourselves  adapt  to  the  notion  of  poverty.    Thus,  even  though 
individuals  eventually  adapt  to  unfortunate  circumstances  of  life,  it  certainly  seems  like  a  worthwhile 
objective  for  the  authorities  to strive  for  an  accurate  evaluation of  the  ‘comprehensive  effect’  of  an 
implemented  policy.    This  can  only  be  achieved via  the  comparison  of  the  initial  ‘ex  ante’  utility  (or 
disutility) derived from of a new circumstance (prior to adaptation taking effect) and the eventual ‘ex post’ 
impact of the change.  Policymakers will then be better equipped to mitigate the unhappiness and disruption 
that people experience in the interim period.
It may be argued that the conclusions of this paper suffer from an inability to control for the respondents’ 
past employment experiences, as this could result in participants carrying with them pre-existing negative 
beliefs about the different contract types when evaluating the vignettes.  Choices elicited in hypothetical 
settings are also likely to be affected by the degree of ‘contextual realism’ that the researcher establishes for 
respondents (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008, p. 225).  Finally, there may be an asymmetry in the nature of the 
shocks faced by temporary and permanent employees in the conjoint exercise, as it is often observed that 
people suffer disproportionately more when a prospect gets worse (as in the case of a temporary contract for 18
permanent contract holders) compared to the utility gain of a prospect that gets better (as with a permanent 
contract for current temporary workers).     
Though  these  arguments  may  be  valid,  psychological  evidence  suggests  that  they  should  not  be 
overemphasized.  Many studies have shown that our memories do not recall past utilities and their duration 
particularly well (Dolan and Kahneman, 2008, p. 226).  Moreover, it is believed that the observation that 
people suffer disproportionately more when the prospect gets worse than they enjoy when it gets better is 
intrinsically related to the working mechanisms of adaptation.  The reason for this is that it is much harder for 
individuals  to  adapt  to  unfortunate  rather  than  to  fortunate  circumstances  of  life.    The  asymmetry  in 
preferences under different prospects may therefore be potentially linked to the asymmetry in the speed of 
adaptation.
As the cross-sectional dataset used in this paper prohibits further investigation of these hypotheses, future 
studies would ideally require a panel vignette dataset tracing the employment status and preferences of the 
same individuals across time.  This could also address the concern for lack of data dependability that is 
endemic in such type of applied statistical work.  The concerns of Dolan and Kahneman (2008, p. 228), who 
have  argued  for  the  need  to  develop  better  measures  of  utility  on  a  moment-to-moment  basis  in  future 
research, are therefore shared by the authors.  It is also important for future academic endeavours to attempt 
to pinpoint the exact timing at which the adaptation process takes precedence in peoples’ perceptions (e.g. to 
provide some estimate of how many months or years it takes for previously permanent workers to adapt to 
precarious contracts).        
APPENDIX
Appendix 1: Procedural issues with respect to the design of the EPICURUS questionnaire
During  the  design  stages  of  the  survey,  the  EPICURUS  research  team  ensured  that,  for  the  purpose  of 
comparability, all countries would respond to an identical questionnaire.  This entailed having the text of the 
survey translated  into  each country’s language by  native  speakers,  so as to  avoid  any  inconsistencies  in 
terminology.
The  data  was  collected  online  from  a  panel  of  Internet  users,  except  for  Greece  where  face-to-face 
interviews were organized instead, since the degree of Internet penetration at the time of the survey was 
relatively low in that country.  The members were invited by e-mail to answer the questionnaire, and within 19
this large  population  respondents  were  screened  through  their  answers  to  the  first  five  questions.    Each 
member of the panel that did not fulfill the criteria of stratification was then forced to stop answering the 
questionnaire and was thanked for their cooperation.  All necessary efforts were made so that the face-to-face 
interviews in Greece were comparable and of a similar format to the internet version faced by the respondents 
of the other six countries of the survey.
Each individual was offered a set of five vignettes at random, each of them consisting of a set of ten 
attributes relating to a hypothetical job.  The creation of such vignettes is not trivial.  There are four steps to 
this methodology: 
- Step 1: Identifying the characteristics - The characteristics or attributes characterizing a job are identified 
(e.g. salary, working hours, type of contract etc.).
- Step  2:  Assigning  levels  to  the  characteristics -  The  levels  must  be  plausible  and  actionable,  thus 
encouraging the respondents to take the exercise seriously.
- Step  3: Design  of  scenarios  (vignettes) -  Vignettes  are  drawn  up  that  describe  all  possible  job 
configurations,  given  the  selected  job  attributes  and  level  possibilities.    Since  the  number  of  scenarios 
increases with the number of characteristics and levels, not all of the vignettes generated can be included in 
the questionnaire as the respondents have a finite attention span.  Thus, experimental designs are used to 
reduce the number to a convenient level.
- Step 4: Establishing preferences - Once designed, the vignettes are offered to respondents, who are asked to 
state their preferences.  Preferences for the scenarios included in the questionnaire are elicited by using one of 
three methods: ranking, rating, or discrete choices.  
In the EPICURUS survey each vignette was a description of a job with ten attributes and multiple levels 
each.  It is evident that this specific choice of attributes is by no means an exhaustive characterisation of a 
typical job situation.  Nevertheless, it is believed that it is sufficient for the purposes of the present analysis, 
since it was clearly indicated to the respondents that all the other aspects of the hypothetical job, except for 
the dimensions explicitly mentioned in the vignette, were similar to their own present working conditions.   
Although the five vignettes were supplied in a specific order, respondents could review each of the five 
vignettes as often as they liked by going backwards and forwards in order to compare the vignettes (Greeks 
could specifically request from their interviewer to review the vignettes, while in the other countries the 
respondents could simultaneously compare all of their vignettes on their PC screens).  With this method the 
problem of ordering effects was eliminated.  20
In order to keep the structure of each vignette simple, readable, and easy to understand, the included text 
in the vignettes was fairly short (see Figure 1).  This facilitated the task of comparing vignettes.  However, 
this could pose a problem, as some attributes cannot be adequately explained by means of a few words.  In 
order  to  overcome  this  difficulty,  some  attributes  were further  explained  by  including  an  additional 
information facility.  In the Internet version of the questionnaire the respondent was able to click and to 
obtain  extra  information,  while  in  the  face-to-face  interviews  the  respondent  could prompt  for  further 
information from the interviewer.
Respondents were finally asked to ‘evaluate’ each of the five vignettes by grading them on a numerical 
scale from 0 to 10.  The choice of the rating method using a scale from 0 to 10  was  made so that the 
respondents’ answers to the vignette experiment  were comparable to the conventional question regarding 
their satisfaction with their current job, which was also rated on a 0-10 scale in the EPICURUS survey.
Appendix 2: The probability model of contractual choice
Given the need to correct for the potential self-selection bias that may arise, a Heckman-type correction 
procedure was also employed as part of the econometric methodology of this paper (Heckman, 1979).  A
selection  equation  was  firstly  estimated  (using  a  random  effects  probit  model),  which  regressed  the 
probability of the individual being in either permanent or temporary employment on the full set of exogenous 
variables (q, X).  A dummy variable indicating whether there are children over the age of 16 in the household 
was also used for identification purposes, on the basis that there is a higher probability of parents (especially, 
mothers) returning to the labour force (and most likely taking up a temporary job) once the children have 
reached working age and the responsibilities of rearing/childcare are reduced.  It was confirmed that this 
particular  identifying  variable  satisfies  the  rank  and  exogeneity  conditions,  while  the  remaining  results 
confirmed the findings of previous studies in the literature (Booth et al., 2002).
xii  The estimated coefficients 
from the selection equation were subsequently used for the calculation of the appropriate Mills ratios, which 
were then included as additional controls in the job evaluation regressions of the permanent and temporary 
sub-samples.  To correct for sampling variability, the standard errors of the explanatory variables were also 
bootstrapped to 500 repetitions.    21
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FIGURE 1. A TYPICAL VIGNETTE
Imagine that, for some reason, you had to stop with your current job and had to look for a new one.  Imagine 
that after a short time you get several offers.  We will list them on the following screen.  These listed job offers 
do not differ from your current job except for some points we specifically mention. 
Can you please evaluate these offers on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst possible and 10 the best 
possible offer? And indicate if they are acceptable?”
Wage: 20% more than now per hour
Type of contract: Permanent with risk of losing the job with no severance pay
Working hours: 20 hours a week 
Working times: Rotating shift system 
Training opportunities: The employer will offer you a 10 workdays training program in the course of the year
Work organization: The job involves working in a varying team
Work conditions: No one controls your work
Work speed: The job is fairly demanding, which means that sometimes you may have to work at high speed
Retirement: You can retire at age 55
Behavioral norms: Same working conditions as in other firms. No loyalty from both sides. Shirking and low 
performance is possible
How would you rate this offer?…….
Please, evaluate this offer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means the worst possible and 10 the best possible 
job.
Would this job offer be acceptable to you? Yes/No26
TABLE 1: THE VIGNETTE ATTRIBUTES AND LEVELS
1. Type of contract (dummy variables)
(i) Permanent contract with no risk of being fired
(ii) Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with economic compensation 
(iii) Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with no economic compensation
(iv) One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a permanent contract
(v) One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a temporary contract
(vi) (ref: One-year contract with no probability of continuation)
2. Working hours:  Ranging from 20 to 50 hours per week.
3. Net wages per hour: expressed as a percentage of wages at the current job (range: -50% to +50%)
4. Working times (dummy variables)
(i) Flexible working hours
(ii) Office working hours (you can choose which days your work)
(iii) Rotating shifts (system)
(iv) (ref: Work. times decided by employer)
5. Training (dummy variables)
(i) 1-3 month training
(ii) 5-10 days training 
(iii) (ref: No training or in the past)
6. Work organization (dummy variables)
(i) Job not in teamwork 
(ii) Job in varying teamwork
(iii) (ref: Job in fixed team)
7. Control over own work (dummy variables)
(i) Job has a fixed routine
(ii) Can choose order tasks: job tasks are fixed, but you may decide when & how things are done
(iii) (ref: No one controls your work)
8a. Intensity due to high speed (dummy variables)
(i) Often high speed
(ii) Sometimes high speed
(iii) (ref: never working at high speed)
8b. Intensity due to tight deadlines (dummy variables)
(i) Often tight deadlines
(ii) Sometimes tight deadlines
(iii) (ref: never working with tight deadlines)
9. Retirement & Labour disability (dummy variables)
(i) Have to stop before 65 (because the job is physically very demanding)
(ii) Early retirement 55 (firm has early retirement plans)
(iii) Early retirement 60 (firm has early retirement plans)
(iv) (ref: the firm has no early retirement plans)
10. Loyalty-no shirking(dummy variables)
(i) Loyalty from both sides; shirking & low performance impossible
(ii) (ref: No loyalty from both sides; shirking & low performance possible)27
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY CONTRACT STATUS 
Variable
Permanent 
Mean (s.d)
Temporary 
Mean (s.d)
Age 37.87 (10.33) 31.85 (10.23)
Male 0.51 (0.49) 0.45 (0.49)
Married 0.70 (0.45) 0.55 (0.49)
Job Tenure 8.93 (8.72) 2.56 (4.34)
Two Jobs 0.09 (0.29) 0.17 (0.37)
Unemployed last year 0.06 (0.24) 0.38 (0.48)
Ln(monthly net wage) 7.5 (1.15) 7.21 (1.12)
Ln(Contract work hours/week) 3.53 (0.29) 3.49 (0.37)
Sector
Non-profit institution 0.06 (0.25) 0.07 (0.27)
Civil service 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39)
Public company 0.11 (0.32) 0.09 (0.30)
(ref. Private company) 0.63 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48)
Occupation
Managers/Professionals 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25)
Technical/Clerical 0.41 (0.49) 0.35 (0.48)
(ref. Other) 0.53 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49)
Training
5-10 days 0.35 (0.47) 0.23 (0.42)
1-3 months 0.06 (0.23) 0.08 (0.26)
(ref. no training or in the past) 0.58 (0.49) 0.68 (0.46)
Control over own work
Job has a fixed routine 0.27 (0.44) 0.40 (0.49)
Can choose order tasks 0.65 (0.47)  0.53 (0.49)
(ref. No one controls your work) 0.07 (0.25) 0.06 (0.24)
Job satisfaction  6.96 (2.10) 6.68 (2.07)28
TABLE  3:  MEAN  EVALUATION  OF  HYPOTHETICAL  CONTRACT  OPTIONS  BY
CONTRACT STATUS
Mean
Permanent
Mean
Temporary
Evaluation Vignette 4.067 4.620
Type of contract (dummy variables)
Permanent contract with no risk of being fired 4.832 5.149
Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with economic compensation  4.444 4.815
Permanent contract with risk of being fired & with no economic compensation 3.887 4.549
One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a permanent 
contract 4.201 4.902
One-year contract with high probability of continuation with a temporary 
contract 3.937 4.526
(ref: One-year contract with no probability of continuation)         2.678 3.12129
TABLE 4: RANDOM EFFECTS COLS JOB EVALUATION REGRESSIONS BY CONTRACT 
STATUS – EFFECT OF VIGNETTE ATTRIBUTES
Controls Selection
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Type of contract
Perm.cont. risk w comp. -0.150 (0.02)*** -0.105 (0.07) -0.144 (0.02)*** -0.097 (0.08)
Perm.cont. risk w no comp. -0.348 (0.02)*** -0.289 (0.07)*** -0.342 (0.02)*** -0.291 (0.07)***
Temp.cont. to perm.cont -0.171 (0.02)*** -0.067 (0.07) -0.171 (0.02)*** -0.057 (0.07)
Temp.cont. to temp.cont -0.158 (0.03)*** -0.042 (0.08) -0.163 (0.03)*** -0.028 (0.08)
Temp.cont.to unempl. -0.417 (0.03)*** -0.327 (0.09)*** -0.407 (0.029)*** -0.317(0.093)** *
(ref. Perm.cont. no risk.)
Ln(Working hours) 7.932 (0.62)*** 10.269 (1.97)*** 7.954 (0.64)*** 10.458 (2.1)***
Ln(Working hours) squared -1.201 (0.09)*** -1.531 (0.28)*** -1.207 (0.09)*** -1.554 (0.3)***
Wages (in % of current 
income) 1.106 (0.02)*** 1.297 (0.07)*** 1.089 (0.02)*** 1.275 (0.07)***
Working times
Flexible working hours 0.12 (0.02)*** 0.062 (0.08) 0.128 (0.02)*** 0.083 (0.08)
Office working hours 0.097 (0.02)*** 0.105 (0.06) 0.103 (0.02)*** 0.109 (0.07)
Rotating shifts -0.070 (0.02)*** -0.081 (0.06) -0.064 (0.02)*** -0.07 (0.06)
(ref. work. Times decided by 
employer)
Training
5-10 days 0.112 (0.02)*** 0.084 (0.06) 0.107 (0.02)*** 0.069 (0.06)
1-3 months 0.065 (0.02)*** 0.134 (0.06)** 0.061 (0.02)*** 0.119 (0.06)**
(ref. No training or in past)
Work organization
Job not in teamwork 0.014 (0.02) 0.061 (0.05) 0.010 (0.02) 0.048 (0.05)
Job in varying teamwork -0.023 (0.02) -0.029 (0.05) -0.026 (0.02) -0.032 (0.05)
(reference: Job in fixed 
team)
Control over own work
Job has a fixed routine -0.133 (0.02)*** -0.136 (0.06)** -0.133 (0.02)*** -0.135 (0.06)**
Can choose order tasks 0.016 (0.02) 0.034 (0.06) 0.008 (0.02) 0.039 (0.06)
(ref. noone controls your 
work)
Intensity due to high 
speed
Often high speed -0.176 (0.02)*** -0.299 (0.06)*** -0.180 (0.02)*** -0.325 (0.06)***
Sometimes high speed -0.031 (0.02) 0.026 (0.07) -0.024 (0.02) -0.013 (0.07)
(ref. never work at high 
speed)
Intensity due to tight 
deadlines
Often tight deadlines -0.127 (0.02)*** -0.027 (0.06) -0.128 (0.02)*** -0.011 (0.07)
Sometimes tight deadlines -0.034 (0.02) -0.102 (0.06)* -0.041 (0.02)** -0.126 (0.07)
(ref. never work tight 
deadlines)
Retirement
Have to stop before 65 0.069 (0.03)** 0.052 (0.09) 0.051 (0.03) 0.048 (0.09)
Early retirement 55 0.204 (0.02)*** 0.275 (0.07)*** 0.201 (0.02)*** 0.272 (0.07)***
Early retirement 60 0.230 (0.02)*** 0.108 (0.07) 0.222 (0.02)*** 0.107 (0.07)
(ref. firm has no early 
retirement plans)
No loyalty-shirking -0.101(0.01)*** -0.151 (0.05)*** -0.101 (0.01)*** -0.157 (0.05)***30
Cons -12.937 (1.09)*** -16.44 (3.44)*** -12.915 (1.13)*** -16.71 (3.59)***
Mills ratios 0.038 (0.14) 0.035 (0.14)
N (groups) 17738 (3582) 1809 (365) 16565 (3344) 1679 (339)
Wald χ
2 (61/62)       6860.36*** 852.06*** 6284.84*** 776.75***
R
2:  within   0.307 0.35 0.302 0.344
R
2:  between 0.153 0.216 0.154 0.226
R
2:  overall 0.253 0.310 0.25 0.309
Notes:  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Personal and current job characteristics as well as country dummies have also 
been included as controls; The remaining regression output is available as supplementary material.31
TABLE  6:  RANDOM  EFFECTS  COLS  JOB  EVALUATION  REGRESSIONS  WITH 
INTERACTION TERMS
Temporary Permanent
Temp-Perm Temp-Temp Temp-Perm Temp-Temp
Coef.(s.e) Coef.(s.e) Coef.(s.e) Coef.(s.e)
Age
Contract dummies -0.126 (0.10) -0.057 (0.11) -0.182 (0.04)*** -0.105 (0.05)**
Contract*age (25-40) 0.079 (0.11) 0.053 (0.12) 0.020 (0.04) -0.051 (0.05)
Contract*age (40-64) 0.088 (0.15) -0.054 (0.16) 0.002 (0.05) -0.069 (0.05)
Gender
Contract dummies -0.019 (0.09) 0.003 (0.09) -0.104 (0.02)*** -0.119 (0.03)***
Contract*Male -0.099 (0.11) -0.09 (0.12) -0.135 (0.03)*** -0.076 (0.04)**
Promotion
Contract dummies -0.12 (0.08) -0.106 (0.08) -0.172 (0.02)*** -0.174 (0.02)***
Contract*Promo (Probable) 0.155 (0.13) 0.244 (0.14) -0.012 (0.04) 0.027 (0.04)
Incentive: Job security
Contract dummies 0.021 (0.10) 0.037 (0.10) -0.189 (0.02)*** -0.135 (0.03)***
Contract*Incentive(Important) -0.13 (0.12) -0.12 (0.13) 0.023 (0.03) -0.055 (0.04)
Financial Situation
Contract dummies -0.003 (0.14) 0.163 (0.15) -0.13 (0.03)*** -0.185 (0.04)***
Contract*Save(Sometimes yes 
or no) -0.061 (0.17) -0.215 (0.18) -0.042 (0.04) 0.052 (0.05)
Contract*Save(No or getting 
into debt) -0.063 (0.16) -0.283 (0.18) -0.066 (0.04) 0.022 (0.05)
Trade union
Contract dummies -0.109 (0.07) -0.087 (0.08) -0.16 (0.02)*** -0.13 (0.02)***
Contract*Union(Yes) 0.141 (0.13) 0.162 (0.14) -0.039 (0.03) -0.081 (0.04)**
Sector
Contract dummies -0.057 (0.08) 0.075 (0.09) -0.189 (0.02)*** -0.138 (0.02)***
Contract*sector(Non-profit) 0.364 (0.23) -0.125 (0.24) 0.036 (0.07) -0.063 (0.07)
Contract*sector(Civil service) -0.201 (0.15) -0.405 (0.16)*** 0.034 (0.04) -0.070 (0.05)
Contract*sector(Public) 0.076 (0.20) -0.186 (0.21) 0.0830 (.06) -0.023 (0.06)
Notes:  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Omitted Interaction terms: Age: 16-25; Gender: Female; Promotion: 
Improbable;  Incentive:  Unimportant;  Financial  Situation:  Nearly  Always,  Yes;  Union:  No;  Occupation:  Managers  & 
professionals; Sector: Private; The full regression output is available from the authors upon request.
TABLE 5: TRADE-OFF RATIOS AND MEASURE OF UTILITY COST BY CONTRACT STATUS 
Trade-off Measure of utility cost
Temp-perm Temp-temp Temp-unem Temp-perm Temp-temp Temp-unem
Temporary -0.051 -0.033 -0.252 Controls
Permanent -0.155 -0.143 -0.377
-0.104 -0.110 -0.125
Temporary -0.045 -0.022 -0.249 Selection
Permanent -0.157 -0.150 -0.374
-0.112 -0.128 -0.125
Notes: The trade-off ratios are calculated from application of eq. (5); the measure of utility cost is given by the difference of the 
respective figures for permanent and temporary employees e.g. Temp-perm (controls): Measure of utility cost = -0.155-(-0.051) = -
0.104. 32
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
TABLE S1: MEAN EVALUATION SCORES BY COUNTRY AND CONTRACT STATUS
Country N
Whole
Mean 
(s.d)
Whole
N
Permanent
Mean
(s.d)
Permanent
N
Temporary
Mean
(s.d)
Temporary
Denmark 4876 4.02 
(2.80) 3926 3.97
(2.79) 389 4.44
(2.95)
France 4896 3.82
(2.87) 3980 3.73
(2.85) 409 4.58
(2.87)
Greece 4000 4.12
(2.66) 3150 4.06
(2.65) 500 4.33
(2.70)
Netherland 4924 4.12
(2.57) 4370 4.08
(2.56) 359 4.50
(2.57)
Spain 1505 4.88
(2.89) 978 4.76
(2.90) 285 5.54
(2.79)
Finland 1612 5.31
(2.82) 1268 5.24
(2.81) 205 5.31
(2.94)
UK 4947 3.98
(2.73) 4403 3.97
(2.73) 283 4.21
(2.79)33
TABLE S2: RANDOM EFFECTS COLS JOB EVALUATION REGRESSIONS BY CONTRACT STATUS – EFFECT OF 
INDIVIDUAL AND CURRENT JOB CHARACTERISTICS
Controls Selection
Permanent Temporary Permanent Temporary
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef s.e.
Personal factors
Male 0.009 (0.019) 0.026 (0.061) 0.006 (0.020) 0.034 (0.064)
Age -0.031 (0.007)*** -0.034 (0.020) -0.033 (0.007)*** -0.038 (0.026)
Age squared 0.000 (0.000)** 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)** 0.000 (0.000)
Married 0.004 (0.02) 0.067 (0.060) 0.005 (0.022) 0.071 (0.067)
Job Tenure -0.006 (0.004) -0.005 (0.016) -0.005 (0.004) 0.007 (0.048)
Job Tenure squared 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.001)
Two Jobs -0.001 (0.031) 0.099 (0.078) 0.005 (0.032) 0.054 (0.105)
Unemployed last year -0.038 (0.037) -0.039 (0.061) -0.046 (0.047) -0.054 (0.197)
Ln(monthly net wage) -0.002 (0.02) -0.044 (0.063) 0.001 (0.021) -0.044 (0.075)
Ln(Contract hours/week) 0.175 (0.039)*** 0.086 (0.084) 0.171 (0.040)*** 0.129 (0.093)
Sector
Non-profit institution -0.058 (0.042) -0.322 (0.124)*** -0.043 (0.045) -0.349 (0.162)**
Civil service -0.033 (0.032) -0.084 (0.094) -0.028 (0.033) -0.093 (0.137)
Public company 0.001 (0.029) -0.070 (0.094) -0.002 (0.031) -0.084 (0.125)
(ref. private company)
Industry
Manufacturing 0.045 (0.032) 0.021 (0.105) 0.043 (0.034) 0.059 (0.118)
Wholesale/retail trade 0.001 (0.033) -0.109 (0.104) 0.004 (0.035) -0.090 (0.112)
Services 0.003 (0.028) 0.016 (0.082) 0.010 (0.030) 0.033 (0.103)
Public admin/education/health 0.010 (0.034) -0.021 (0.091) 0.008 (0.035) -0.011 (0.094)
(ref. other)
Occupation
Managers/Professionals 0.046 (0.040) 0.010 (0.126) 0.037 (0.041) 0.007 (0.151)34
Technical/Clerical -0.045 (0.020)** 0.048 (0.063) -0.050 (0.021)** 0.046 (0.066)
(ref. other)
Working times
Always same working times -0.036 (0.029) -0.027 (0.092) -0.039 (0.03) -0.097 (0.101)
Rotating shifts 0.008 (0.036) 0.111 (0.114) 0.009 (0.038) 0.057 (0.122)
Employee decides -0.028 (0.046) 0.020 (0.111) -0.046 (0.048) -0.040 (0.125)
Employee+employer decide -0.028 (0.036) 0.156 (0.135) -0.026 (0.037) 0.110 (0.147)
(ref. decided by employer)
Work organization
Job in fixed team 0.001 (0.024) -0.085 (0.079) 0.010 (0.025) -0.090 (0.084)
Job in varying teamwork -0.010 (0.032) -0.274 (0.099)*** 0.008 (0.034) -0.319 (0.114)***
(ref. Job not in teamwork)
Training
5-10 days -0.030 (0.020) -0.051 (0.066) -0.032 (0.020) -0.069 (0.089)
1-3 months -0.037 (0.039) -0.051 (0.106) -0.037 (0.041) -0.065 (0.112)
(ref. no training or in the past)
Control over own work
Job has a fixed routine -0.053 (0.039) 0.005 (0.118) -0.056 (0.041) -0.007 (0.131)
Can choose order tasks -0.031 (0.036) 0.028 (0.11) -0.035 (0.037) 0.036 (0.13)
(ref. No one controls your work)
Country dummies
Denmark  -0.012 (0.061) 0.096 (0.19) -0.022 (0.064) 0.046 (0.269)
France  -0.119 (0.030)*** 0.033 (0.105) -0.118 (0.032)*** -0.016 (0.144)
Greece  -0.007 (0.035) -0.020 (0.112) -0.007 (0.037) -0.084 (0.202)
Netherlands  0.070 (0.031)** 0.089 (0.110) 0.057 (0.033) 0.073 (0.177)
Spain  0.212 (0.046)*** 0.287 (0.116)** 0.227 (0.05)*** 0.192 (0.247)
Finland  0.339 (0.045)*** 0.231 (0.145) 0.337 (0.046)*** 0.180 (0.212)
(ref. UK)
Notes:  ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Vignette characteristics have also been controlled for as shown in Table 4 of the main text.35
TABLE S3: RANDOM EFFECTS PROBIT REGRESSION OF TEMPORARY VS. 
PERMANENT CONTRACT STATUS
Coef s.e.
Male -0.101 (0.135)
Age -0.123 (0.046)***
Age squared 0.001 (0.001)**
Married -0.026 (0.151)
Job Tenure -0.374 (0.028)***
Job Tenure squared 0.009 (0.001)***
Two Jobs 0.699 (0.199)***
Unemployed last year 2.081 (0.176)***
Ln(monthly net wage) -0.385 (0.139)***
Ln(Contract hours/week) -0.075 (0.231)
Sector
Non-profit institution 0.773 (0.297)***
Civil service 0.922 (0.225)***
Public company 0.765 (0.221)***
(ref. private company)
Industry
Manufacturing -0.485 (0.242)**
Wholesale/retail trade -0.397 (0.225)
Services -0.491 (0.194)**
Public admin/education/health -0.112 (0.227)
(ref. other)
Occupation
Managers/Professionals 0.549 (0.267)**
Technical/Clerical -0.184 (0.141)
(ref. other)
Working times
Always same working times -0.134 (0.215)
Rotating shifts -0.326 (0.262)
Employee decides 0.511 (0.286)
Employee+employer decide -0.256 (0.276)
(ref. work. times decided by employer)
Work organization
Job in fixed team -0.036 (0.175)
Job in varying teamwork 0.355 (0.227)
(ref. Job not in teamwork)
Training
5-10 days -0.576 (0.151)***
1-3 months 0.247 (0.242)
(ref. no training or in the past)
Control over own work
Job has a fixed routine -0.491 (0.260)
Can choose order tasks -0.599 (0.236)**
(ref. No one controls your work)36
Country dummies
Denmark 1.898 (0.418)***
France 0.866 (0.229)***
Greece 1.471 (0.238)***
Netherlands 1.118 (0.240)***
Spain 2.109 (0.287)***
Finland 0.993 (0.351)***
(ref. UK)
ID var: Children over age 16 0.564 (0.154)***
cons 3.671 (7.018)
N 18276 (3686)
Wald chi2 (61)       952.39***
Log likelihood   -1427.37
Notes:  **  significant  at  5%;  ***  significant  at  1%;  The  regression  has  also  controlled  for  the  vignette 
characteristics, though they are omitted here as they are all insignificant variables. The full regression output is 
available from the authors upon request.NOTES
                                                
i According to Frederick and Loewenstein (1999), hedonic adaptation occurs when there is a “reduction in the 
affective intensity of favourable and unfavourable circumstances”.
ii The theory of cognitive dissonance suggests that contradicting elements of knowledge (cognitions) serve as 
a driving force that compel the human mind to modify existing beliefs. The existence of dissonance, being 
psychologically uncomfortable, motivates the person to reduce the dissonance by altering his current beliefs 
and leads to avoidance of information likely to increase the dissonance. The greater the magnitude of the 
dissonance, the greater is the pressure to reduce dissonance.
iii  However,  their  study  did  find  evidence  that  fixed-term  contracts  function  as  effective  stepping-stones 
towards permanent jobs, especially for women.
iv The first studies on conjoint analysis came from the field of marketing research (Luce and Tukey, 1964 and 
Green and Srinivasan, 1978).  In these studies, respondents are often faced with the evaluation of a new 
consumer product before it is introduced to the market.  Recently this approach is also widely applied to 
environmental and health economics.  Van Beek, Koopmans and Van Praag (1997) and Van Leeuwen and 
Van Praag (2002) were the first to have used this approach in a labour economics context.
v Defining the hourly wage in the vignette in terms of a relative deviation from the current wage of the 
respondent circumvents the usual problem of wage definition and the problems that arise if respondents with 
different wages evaluate the same vignettes.
vi The COLS method has been shown to yield consistent parameter estimates (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fritjers, 
2004; Stewart, 1983).  It is a variant of the so-called ‘interval regression’ method.  This approach yields 
parameter estimates that are  nearly identical to those obtained by Ordered Probit (except for a factor of 
proportionality), are as efficient as Probit-estimation (as the t-values are approximately the same), but it is 
computationally much easier.  It is also important to note that the so-called ‘trade-off’ ratios, indicating the 
marginal rate of substitution between two attributes, are not dependent on the specific method used.  The 
reason  is  that  the  COLS  procedure,  which  entails  a  specific  monotonic  labeling  convention,  ultimately 
describes the same indifference curves as the more traditional Ordered Probit/Logit estimates.
vii The justification for choosing to use random rather than fixed effects is twofold.  Firstly, a simple Hausman 
test  reveals  no  systematic  difference  in  the  estimated  coefficients  between  the  random  and  fixed  effects 
models.    Secondly,  the  random  effects  model  allows  for  the  assessment  of  the  influence  of  individual 
variables  like  age,  gender  and  educational  level  on  the  evaluation  of  the  vignettes.    The  results  are 
nevertheless unchanged when a fixed effects methodology is used (available from the authors upon request).
viii It was deemed necessary to pool all of the countries of the survey together, as the sample of permanent and 
temporary workers in one country alone would be very small and would not allow for a robust econometric 
analysis.  Country fixed effects are nevertheless included in all of the regressions to control for potential 
national differences in job perceptions and institutional features. 
ix The remaining percentage of workers was engaged in casual, seasonal, or other work, so they were dropped 
from the analysis.
x  A table  of  the  mean  evaluation  scores  by  country  and  contract  status  can  be  found  as  supplementary 
material. 
xi The exact wording of the ‘incentives’ question in the EPICURUS survey is: “Which, if any, of the things 
listed below will induce you to increase your effort in your job? Please grade each factor by a number from 1 
to 5, where 1 stands for ‘very unimportant’ and 5 stands for ‘very important’: The risk of losing your job”; 
while  the  question  regarding  the  respondents’  financial  situation  was  stated  as  follows:  “In  the  present 
circumstances, does your household save any money from the current income? 1. Yes, nearly always; 2. 
Sometimes yes, sometimes no; 3. No, hardly ever; 4. We are getting more and more into debt”.
xii The results of the selection equation are available as supplementary material.